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Author(s)	Akita, Shigeru
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The Second Anglo-Boer War and India

Shigeru AKITA

In recent years, there have appeared some excellent books and research about the turning of the era from the 19th to 20th century in the fields of British imperial history and British imperialism. For example, E.J.Hobsbown published *The Age of Empire 1875-1914* (London, 1987) and completed his comprehensive historical works on "the long nineteenth-century." L.E.Davis and R.A.Huttenback published *Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire : The Economics of British Imperialism* (Cambridge, 1986) and argued one very orthodox theme of British economic history, "Costs and Benefits of British Imperialism," by using cliometrics. Their provocative book has renewed our interest in this question and lead to controversy among some famous imperial historians.⁽¹⁾ In addition to these, two excellent books written in Japanese have been published by joint-research groups : One, *British Capitalism and the Imperialistic World* (Fukuoka, 1990) written by a Tohoku University group, reveals the economic structure of the imperialistic world-system. The other, *The World at the Turn of the Century : the Stratified Structure of Imperial Rule* (Tokyo, 1989) is by D.Yui and Y.Kibata et al.

Although I am much impressed with these new works, the purpose of this paper is to interrelate the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) and India from the following two points of view.

(1) The Second Anglo-Boer War seemed to be a great watershed of British imperial history. The U.K. faced the problem of rising cost of defending the empire and was forced to transform the structure of the British Empire. S.B.Saul's *Studies in British Overseas Trade 1870-1914* (Liverpool, 1960) revealed the economic interrelation of the British Empire, that is, the system of multilateral trade and settlement. While I'll appreciate the results of those economic history analyses in this paper, first, I'll reveal the politico-military interrelationship and the changing structure of the British Empire during this critical era, centering around the largest formal empire, India.

(2) At the turn of the century from the 19th to 20th, the capitalist modern world-system, what was called "Pax Britannica," was left unsettled by the Second Anglo-Boer War. In that sense, this era seemed to be the first step towards the change of world-hegemony

from the U.K. to the U.S.A.. Of course, there has been some well-grounded research on this theme in the field of international politics.⁽²⁾ However, their main concern was only to build abstract models from British historical experiences. I'll go further, clarifying the British dilemma and their racism, attaching much importance to their attitude toward Native Indian troops.

Native Indian troops were often dispatched overseas in the 19th century in order to expand and defend the British Empire in the East. In response to them, Indian nationalists severely criticized those imperial military activities, but I cannot find any official record of Native Indian troops having been dispatched to South Africa during the Boer War. Why were Native Indian troops not mobilized in large numbers during this critical British imperial war? Previous research only indicated the mutual relationship between India and South Africa.⁽³⁾ In addition research by Indian scholars was likely to concentrate on the political struggles between Viceroy Curzon and the Indian National Congress, and lacked any concern about the external relationship of British Empire.⁽⁴⁾ Therefore, I'll put much emphasis upon the mobilization of Native Indian troops as the connecting rod between India and South Africa.

I have looked through and investigated the following documents——*British Parliamentary Papers* such as the Welby Commission's Final Report on Indian Expenditure (1990), the Royal Commission's Reports on War in South Africa (1903) and some influential British and Indian newspapers.

1 The Report of the Welby Commission, 1900

The problem of dispatching Native Indian troops outside India and payment for their services was often the most controversial theme between the India Office and the Government of India in the latter half of the 19th century. Resolutions on military problems were adopted at every annual meeting of the Indian National Congress. Under such circumstances, the Royal Commission on the Administration of Expenditure of India (Indian Expenditure Commission), headed by Lord Welby, was appointed by Royal Warrant on May 24, 1895. The main aim of this Commission is to inquire into the Administration and Management of the Military and Civil Expenditure incurred under the authority of the Secretary of State for India in Council, or of the Government of India, and the apportionment of charges between the governments of the United Kingdom and of India for purposes in which both were interested. After 5 years of deliberation, the

Commission submitted its final report on April 6, 1900. ⁽⁵⁾ The Second Anglo-Boer War had just broken out about six months before.

The Final Report consists of the following three sections and a separate report : I . The Financial Machinery of the Government of India. II . The Progress of Expenditure during recent years. III . The apportionment of Expenditure between India and the United Kingdom. This report is a comprehensive survey about Indian Finance and is essential for the study of Anglo-Indian financial relationships; however, in this paper, I put much emphasis upon Section III which mainly concerns payment for the deployment of Native Indian troops outside India.

In Section III of the Final Report, the Commission ascertained that the final authority for determining the relative interests of the United Kingdom and of India must reside in the Home Government and in Parliament. It covers the whole range of civil, army and naval budgets. Regarding the civil expenditures, part of the cost of maintaining the Legation and Consulates in Persia and China was borne by Indian Finance. India also requested to continue to pay Naval contributions (£100,000) on the grounds that the Australian colonies and the Cape now contribute to their naval defence.⁽⁶⁾ India was obliged to pay costs of maintaining the British Empire in areas wide of the Indian Ocean, including the Far East.

As for the army costs, the Final Report recommended the following geographical principles for deploying Native Indian troops outside India.

(1) India has not a direct and substantial interest in the deployment of forces in Europe; in Africa, west of the Cape of Good Hope; along the African coast south of Zanzibar; in Asia, East of China; in Japan or countries or islands east and south of China.

(2) India has a direct and substantial interest in keeping open the Suez Canal, and in the maintenance of order and established government in Egypt. This interest might extend to the coasts of the Red Sea, but not to the Soudan, or further extensions of Egypt up the valley of the Nile or its affluents. India also has a direct and substantial interest in questions affecting Persia, and the coasts and islands of Arabia and of the Persian Gulf; in questions affecting Afghanistan and that part of Central Asia which is adjacent to the borders of India of Afghanistan; and in questions affecting Siam.

(3) India may have a modified interest in questions affecting the East Coast of Africa as far as Zanzibar, and the African islands in the Indian Ocean, except Madagascar; in questions affecting China and the Malay peninsula.

(4) Special cases may arise giving to India a direct and substantial interest in questions connected with Europe or other territories in which the minute declares her to have, as a general rule, no interest.⁽⁷⁾

(Refer to the attaching geographical map concerned with Native Indian troops.)

According to the geographical distribution, the Government of India might have been required to bear *a part of the military expenses* for native Indian troops, if the areas for its dispatch were within areas where India had a substantial or modified interest (as in (2) to (3) above). These principles are consistent with the preceding agreement which the Secretary of State for India had expressed in 1896 at the Suakin Expedition,⁽⁸⁾ and except for the Soudan Expedition (1896-99), all Native Indian troop expeditions in the 19th century were affirmed. We must notice that the relationship between India and South Africa, especially regarding the interior zones, is vague and uncertain on one hand, and that India has a modified interest in questions affecting China on the other.

Finally, the Final Report admitted the request for asking liberal treatment of the India Office based upon the following grounds: (1) India provides a large army to maintain British supremacy in the East. (2) A different organisation of forces is needed in the United Kingdom and India; there can, therefore, be no true partnership between them. The Commission recommended to the Imperial Government that the exceptional position of India as to military expenses should always be kept in view, and that grants of £293,000 should be made by the Imperial Government to the Government of India.⁽⁹⁾ According to this report, the Home Government promised grants (liberal treatment) which were equal to only 1 per cent of the Home Charges, the equivalent of only 0.3 per cent of Indian Finance. We may say that the military costs and burden on India were scarcely mitigated by the Final Report of the Welby Commission.

Against these recommendations, some members of the Commission expressed reservations. One member insisted that the maintenance of the military defence of India was one of the greatest Imperial questions and that the military fiscal burden imposed on India had no parallel elsewhere in the British Empire.⁽¹⁰⁾ A fierce criticism to the Final Report was expressed in Separate (minority) Report.⁽¹¹⁾ This Separate Report complained that the Final Report only summarised the book-keeping and departmental mechanism and that it didn't sufficiently consider whether the public expenditure had been so controlled and guided as to promote in the most effectual way the general prosperity of the Indian people. It also requested a reconsideration of the Anglo-Indian financial relationship from

the Indian point of view, and reflected the opinion of famous Indian nationalist, moderate leader of the Indian National Congress, Dadabhai Naoroji. He insisted that there existed an abnormal economic condition in India and that the increased fiscal burden was imposed to meet not so much the growing needs of India as to increase the ever increasing drain of remittances to the U.K.. He put much emphasis upon the extreme poverty of the masses in India and the urgent necessity of a reduction in the general scale of Indian expenditure through *the Indianization* (more employment of the best and most intelligent of the Natives in higher levels of the service) of administration. ⁽¹²⁾ Regarding apportionment of military costs, he stressed that in the case of wars carried on in distant lands, such as Abyssinia, Soudan, Egypt, East Africa, or *the Cape*, no expenditure should be placed upon India, either ordinary or extraordinary. Mr. Naoroji took the endurance of the British Empire for granted and desired equal shares and burdens among the constituents of the Empire. His stance represents the early moderate nationalist opinions.

2 The Anglo-Boer War and the Indian Army

The Second Anglo-Boer War broke out in October 1899. Against the early optimistic expectation, it continued until May 1902, two and half years, and finally required the deployment of about 450,000 soldiers. I will reveal the position of the native Indian army within the framework of army mobilizations by using the Parliamentary Reports (WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA) of 1904. ⁽¹³⁾

From Table 2 it will be noticed that 18,534 officers and men (18,229 belonged to the Regular Army; 305 volunteers) were sent to South Africa during the war. Table 3 shows that the first Indian regiments (5,903 men) were dispatched urgently just before the outbreak of the war. In fact the Secretary of State for War, Lord Lansdowne, had decided on the scheme for sending 10,000 men to reinforce and defend Natal on September 7, 1899. ⁽¹⁴⁾ These battalions were fit for emergency service, and fulfilled the military role of India, "the British Barracks in the Oriental Seas." However, there remains one big problem, the composition of reinforcements from India. Table 3 only indicated the Regular Forces employed in South Africa during the whole war. In the case of India, it meant the Regular Home Army (the European Army) stationed in India, and native Indian soldiers were completely excluded from Tables 2 and 3. Weren't native Indian soldiers truly mobilized in South Africa during the war?

Strictly speaking, native Indian personnel were dispatched to South Africa after all.

According to evidence presented by Major-General Sir Edwin H. Collen to the Royal Commission, the Government of India had sent 469 native soldiers as non-combatants and 6,602 native non-combatants (for a total of 7,071) to South Africa at different times. ⁽¹⁵⁾ The native personnel were sent as non-combatants to help in the remount depots, and to act as orderlies. In that number of native non-combatants, there were transport corps, water-carrier corps, corps of Syces and corps of native washermen. They went to South Africa with the Regular Home Army stationed in India. In this sense, only a few native Indian soldiers were sent to South Africa, but strangely this fact was not recorded in any of the Official British Papers. Why were native Indian troops not mobilized in large numbers during this critical British Imperial war?

In order to reply to the above question, we must first recognise the attitude of the British Government to the Anglo-Boer War. The British Conservative Government had determined that the Anglo-Boer War should be a "White man's war," hostilities were to be only between two European races. The First Lord of the Treasury, Mr. A.J. Balfour, had declared that there was no intention of using any but white troops, ⁽¹⁶⁾ and again stressed that the war in South Africa was not to be carried on under ordinary conditions, and that by common consent, it was decided it should be confined to the two European races chiefly concerned. ⁽¹⁷⁾ This myth of a "White man's war" was strongly held by the Home Government and became a kind of unwritten rule. However, Dr. Peter Warwick threw strong doubt on this myth and revealed the large mobilization of native African peoples. According to his research, over 100,000 of them became directly involved in the struggle as scouts, spies, guards, servants and messengers, and in a wide range of other jobs with the white armies. At least 10,000 and possibly as many as 30,000 blacks were fighting with the British army as armed combatants by the end of the war. ⁽¹⁸⁾ The British Government, however, didn't officially admit these facts. In January 1901 the commander in chief in South Africa, Lord Kitchener, contemplated the possibility of sending a number of Indian cavalry regiments to South Africa. However, St John Brodrick, the Secretary of State for War, believed that to send Indian soldiers to South Africa as combatants would appear as a confession of weakness, since the impression would be given that the army had no more white troops left. ⁽¹⁹⁾

In the early stages of the war, there appeared some public opinions favourable to sending native Indian troops to South Africa as combatants both in the U.K. and in India. For example, on November 30, and December 2, 1899 some letters were published

in *THE TIMES* which strongly advocated the dispatch of Indian troops. The tone of *THE TIMES* was positive for employing Indian troops in South Africa, making reference to the precedent set by Lord Disraeli's Malta expedition in 1878. ⁽²⁰⁾ *THE TIMES OF INDIA* (an English paper published in Bombay) also published some letters which favoured the dispatch of native Indian troops or Indian volunteers. ⁽²¹⁾ Of course, some native Indian newspapers published in Bengal severely criticised the Anglo-Boer War as an imperialistic, unjust and aggressive war to the Boers. ⁽²²⁾ Mr. Gandhi in South Africa, on the other hand, was very eager to serve the Imperial war, and he organized an Indian ambulance corps in Natal in order to perform the duties of honorable "British subjects". ⁽²³⁾ In spite of these favourable circumstances for mobilizing native Indian troops to South Africa, the Home Government adhered to the principle of a "White man's war" in South Africa.

The second reply to the above question is concerned with the changing structure of the military system in the British Empire. The strength of British military forces at the moment of the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer War is delimited in the following. ⁽²⁴⁾

• the Regular Army.....	Home.....	125,105	Men
	Colonies and Egypt.....	51,204	
	India.....	73,157	
		<hr/>	
		249,466	
• In addition to the Regular Army			
	Army Reserve.....	90,000	Men
	Militia(including Militia Reserve).....	129,572	
	Yeomanry(including staff).....	11,891	
	Volunteers.....	264,833	
	Channel Islands Militia.....	3,996	
	Malta and Bermuda Militia.....	2,732	
		<hr/>	
	Total	752,490	Men
Cf. Native Indian Troops.....	c.	140,000	

According to Lieutenant-General Sir William Nicholson, "out of a force of 750,000, of whom about 630,000 were normally stationed in the United Kingdom, only two Army Corps and a Cavalry Division—about 70,000 men in all—were organised and available for

dispatch across the seas for the reinforcement of any part of the Empire that might be attacked, or for offensive action” . ⁽²⁵⁾ Therefore the first reinforcements were dispatched from India (the Regular Home Army stationed in India) to meet the emergency in Natal.

The British Home Government was confused by the hard fighting of the first phase of the war, and was forced hastily to dispatch reinforcements of 160,000 men from the U.K. by July 1900. In this sense, it was necessary, almost from the beginning of the campaign, to invite Militia Regiments to volunteer for foreign service, and to accept the assistance of Yeomanry, Volunteers, and *Colonial forces*. In fact, when the Queensland Colonial Government voluntarily proposed to offer 250 men to service in South Africa on 11 July 1899, the Home Government welcomed the proposal. On 3 October 1899, Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, the Secretary of State for Colonies, sent cablegrams to the Governors of Canada, New Zealand, and the several Australian Colonies in order to request Colonial forces. The Imperial Government would provide pay at Imperial rates, supplies, and ammunition; reimburse transport expenses for each Colony, pay disablement pensions, and compassionate allowances at Imperial rates. ⁽²⁶⁾ In response to this request, the total number of 29,090 “Overseas” Colonials (Colonial Contingents) were engaged in campaigns in South Africa (7,368 Canadians, 16,632 Australians and 6,343 New Zealanders). In addition, a large body of men (from 50,000 to 60,000 men) was raised in South Africa itself. The total strength of the Overseas and South African Colonial Forces was about equal to the official estimate of Boer troops during the whole period of the war. According to the evidence submitted to the Royal Commission, the Overseas Colonial Forces were of great value and provided good and useful service throughout the war, and their superior fighting spirit was highly admired. Their great achievements proved that such forces could be an important adjunct to the Regular Home Army in any future war and that the Imperial Government could have “much confidence in the strength and unanimity of the loyalty of the Empire, and of the value of that loyalty if properly used within the limitations which circumstances impose ” . ⁽²⁷⁾ Under these expectations, it was not necessary to mobilize a large number of native Indian troops to South Africa as combatants.

The existence of the Welby Commission and its Final Report seemed to prevent the deployment of a large number of native Indian troops to South Africa. When the Anglo-Boer War had broken out, the inquiries and discussions of the Commission were going on. Some Liberal M.P.’s expressed anxiety about dispatching the Regular Home

Army stationed in India to Natal as an emergency measure in October 1899. The Imperial Government had to take a cautious attitude in sending native Indian troops to South Africa at the moment when the Final Report of the Welby Commission had just been submitted after five years of inquiries.⁽²⁸⁾ Especially, as I have already mentioned before, under the clauses of the Final Report, the interior zones of South Africa had been left vague and uncertain for the dispatch of a native Indian army. There was also a loophole in the Final Report which was favourable to an arbitrary interpretation of the Imperial Government. It might have been possible to shelve the Final Report. Therefore, I had better next consider the military deployments of native Indian troops outside India and the shift of international situations at the turn of the century.

3 The Boxer Rebellion and the Indian Army

The military deployments of Indian forces at the turn of the century were almost in line with the geographical recommendations of the Final Report of the Welby Commission. According to the statement of George Hamilton, the Secretary of State for India, in the House of Commons, the deployments of Indian troops in 1900 were as follows:⁽²⁹⁾

- One battalion of native Indian infantry (1,500 men) was sent to Mauritius.
- 800 native Indian troops and 2,100 British troops (European Army) moved to Ceylon.
- One battalion of native Indian infantry (800 men) was dispatched to Singapore.

In exchange for these deployments, the Regular Home Army (European Army) stationed in each dependency (Formal Empire) was dispatched to South Africa. The principle of a "White men's war" in South Africa was reflected in these interchangeable army deployments. At the same time, 300 British troops and 3,376 native Indian troops were sent to British Somaliland (Formal Empire) in order to suppress native turbulence.

However, the overseas dispatch of native Indian troops on a large scale was carried out in China in response to the Boxer Rebellion in 1900. China was one of the areas of the British "Informal Empire" in the Far East, and since the Opium War, native Indian troops had been dispatched to China two times. Once was in case of the attack of Guangdong in 1856-57 (5,787 Indian men), and the other was during the occupation of Peking in the Second Opium War (11,000 men). In both cases the fiscal burden of the native Indian troops had been borne by the Home Government.⁽³⁰⁾ The news of Boxer's siege against the diplomatic corps in Peking came upon the Great Powers as a great shock, and they responded to this crisis by dispatching the combined rescue columns to Peking.

While the British Government was under pressure to reinforce the campaigns in South Africa, they first called on the Japanese Government to send a large force in July 1900 and then dispatched native Indian troops as an emergency measure. They also mobilized British Garrisons from Hong Kong and Weihaiwei. Almost half of the combined forces was Japanese and the number of British forces was about 3,000 men, mainly native Indian troops. An Indian unit was said to enter into the castle of Peking first.

Finally, the troops sent from India to China to assist in putting down the Boxer Rebellion were 2,300 British troops (European Army) and 18,700 native Indian troops, totally 22,000 men. ⁽³¹⁾ In addition two Australian colonies were sent 460 volunteers in response to the Imperial Government's request. Such military cooperation was highly appreciated as an upsurge of patriotic sentiments. Under the international pressures of critical public opinion, the British Imperial Government dared to send the largest scale of native Indian troops to China where the diplomatic and economic interests of the Great Powers were mingled with each other and the maintenance of the status quo was essential for British and Indian interests. Native Indian troops appeared again in Peking.

The Indian nationalists levelled caustic criticism at the deployments of native Indian troops outside India at this critical stage. The chairman of the 1902 Indian National Congressional Session, Mr. Surendranath Banerjea and the Imperial Legislative Councilor of the Indian Government, Mr. Gopal Krishna GoKhale criticised the heavy military establishment and the excessive Indian military budget which made it possible to dispatch large Indian forces overseas. In response to such criticism, the British Imperial Government defrayed £2,930,000 from the Home Budget to save the Indian Government by reason of the deployment of native Indian troops in behalf of the British interests in China. ⁽³²⁾

Conclusion

I have already considered the deployments of native Indian troops at the turn of the century, and I may come to the following conclusions.

First, the structural interrelation of the British Empire centering upon India was typically represented in the Final Report of the Welby Commission about the geographical principles of deploying native Indian troops outside India. Its report justified the wide military deployment of native Indian troops along the Empire Routes in Asia and Africa, from the Suez Canal in Egypt to China. The military role of the native Indian army as the

Empire's advance guard was strengthened at this turn of the century. At the same time, this military mobilization system was supplemented with military cooperation and additional voluntary forces from White Colonies (Canada, Australian colonies and New Zealand). Colonial military cooperation and financial contribution to the Imperial Government gradually progressed from the late 1880s. Its effectiveness and the unity of the British Empire were first demonstrated by the Colonial overseas contingents of the Anglo-Boer War. This would lead to the comprehensive total war military-system of the First World War.

Secondly, I referred to the British responses to the transformation of the modern world-system. In this paper I put much emphasis upon the mobilization of native Indian troops on the largest scale during the Boxer Rebellion in 1900. Britain had maintained a dominant commercial position in China since the mid-19th century. However, at the turn of the century, the German Empire, the United States (ascending "Core" Countries in the modern world-system) and Japan (an ascending "Semi-Peripheral" country) began to challenge the supremacy of Britain in the China market, and the scramble for Chinese territories was intensified. Although Britain needed urgent military reinforcements in South Africa in 1900, native Indian troops were urgently dispatched to China along the military precedents at this critical stage. We can interpret the presence of a large native Indian Army in China as "a sense of crisis" of the British Imperial Government, can't we? However, it might be more insightful to relate the British response to the Boxer Rebellion with the Anglo-Boer War. I have already noted that the British Government was reluctant to deploy native Indian troops in South Africa, and only a few were sent as non-combatants. Behind this reluctance of the British Imperial Government, there may exist the strong ideology of racism, or an adherence to the belief in superiority of the White race over Asian and African natives. Immanuel Wallerstein points out that this kind of racism was the peculiar ideology of Hegemonic Power in the modern world-system.⁽³³⁾ The myth of a "White man's war" in South Africa had to be kept forever if the British Imperial Government wished to retain its Hegemonic Power status in the modern world-system. In a sense, this politico-military dilemma of the descending Hegemonic Power, the U.K., prevented her from deploying a large number of native Indian troops in South Africa and this, in turn, prolonged the Anglo-Boer War.

Later during the First World War, about 1,100,000 Indian people were sent overseas and 130,000 native Indian troops were mobilized and forced to fight against white man's soldiers on the Western Front.⁽³⁴⁾ We can't find such a serious sense of crisis at the turn

of the century. However, the military deployments of native Indian troops seemed to reflect the dilemma of a descending Hegemonic Power, the British Empire, a dilemma which she had to face realistically within the changing modern world-system.

【NOTES】

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 - (24) WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA, (1) Regular Army—Strength of the Force Employed in South Africa, pp.34-36.
 - (25) *Ibid.*, pp.33-34.
 - (26) *Ibid.*, Colonial Contingents, Oversea Colonial Forces, pp. 76-83.
 - (27) *Ibid.*, pp.76-77,80. Cf.D.C.Gordon, *The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defense, 1870-1914*, (Baltimore,1965), Chap.VI. ; G.S.J.Barclay, *The Empire is Marching: A Study of the Military Effort of the British Empire 1800-1945*, (London,1976), Chap.3.
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[Table 1]

Return of Military Expeditions in which British, Colonial, or Native Troops have been Employed during the last Ten Years.

Year.	Expedition.	Troops employed.			Duration.	Cost.		Remarks.
		British.	Colonial.	Native.				
1895	Chitral	5,000	—	10,400	7months	£	s. d.	
						1,222,600	0 0	
1895—1896	Ashanti	1,000	—	1,000	2months	192,490	0 0	Inclusive of about 100,000 £ defrayed from Army funds.
1896	Matabeleland	660	2,143	5,129	9months	2,586,907	4 0	These figures were supplied by the British South Africa Company.
1896	Mashonaland	570	1,550	—	6½ months			
1897	Mashonaland	—	650	120	10months			
1896—1899	Sudan	7,500	—	12,500	9month	2,415,000	0 0	
1897—1898	North—West Frontier of India	15,000	—	37,000	8months	2,600,000	0 0	
1899—1902	South Africa	365,693	82,742	—	2years 8months	187,725,700	0 0	Approximate cost to 31st March 1903. against Army Votes only.
1900	Ashanti	—	—	4,000	9months	428,000	0 0	Inclusive of about 50,000 £. defrayed from Army funds.
1900—1901	China	23,000	—	18,700	6 $\frac{2}{3}$ months	5,827,800	0 0	Approximate cost to 31st March 1903.

(Source) *British Parliamentary Papers*, 1903, Vol. 38, 108 (Military Expeditions, 1895—1900).

[Table 2]

The total number of officers and men of all Regular and Auxiliary Forces employed in the South African War.

		Officers, exclusive of Staff.	Non-Commissioned Officers and Men.					Total Officers and Men.
			Cavalry.	Artillery.	Infantry and Mounted Infantry.	Others.	Total.	
Garrison on 1st August, 1899—		318	1,127	1,035	6,428	1,032	9,622	9,940
From Home	Regulares	9,206	22,348	18,426	156,288	21,903	218,965	228,171
	Militia	1,691	—	906	42,610	359	43,875	45,566
	Yeomanry	1,393	—	—	—	—	34,127	35,520
	Scottish Horse	15	—	—	—	—	818	833
	Volunteers	589	—	—	—	—	19,267	19,856
	S.African Constabulary	19	—	—	—	—	7,254	7,273
	Total from Home	12,913	—	—	—	—	324,306	337,219
From India	Regulares	568	3,483	1,029	13,133	16	17,661	18,229
	Volunteers	16	—	—	—	—	289	305
	Total from India	584	—	—	—	—	17,950	18,534
From Colonies	Colonial Contingents	1,391	—	—	—	—	27,699	29,090
	South African Constabulary (Canada)	29	—	—	—	—	1,209	1,238
	Total from Colonies	1,420	—	—	—	—	28,908	30,328
Raised in South Africa		* 2,324	—	—	—	—	* 50,090	* 52,414
Total		17,599	—	—	—	—	430,876	448,435

*These numbers are uncertain.


(Source) *British Parliamentary Papers*, 1904, Vol.40, Cd. 1789, p.43.

[Table 3]

Regular Forces employed in South Africa during the whole War, with their composition and periods of arrival :—

	Officers, exclusive of Staff.	Non-Commissioned Officers and Men.					Total Officers and Men.
		Cavalry.	Artillery.	Infantry and Mounted Infantry.	Others.	Total.	
I. Garrison on 1st August, 1899	318	1,127	1,035	6,428	1,032	9,622	9,940
II. Reinforcements, 1st August, 1899, to 11th October 1899 (outbreak of war) —							
(1.) From Home	280	—	743	5,620	—	6,363	6,643
(2.) From India (some of these did not reach South Africa until after the outbreak of hostilities)	259	1,564	653	3,427	—	5,644	5,903
Total	539	1,564	1,396	9,047	—	12,007	12,546
III. Further reinforcements from 11th October, 1899, to end of July, 1900—							
Regulars—							
(1.) From Home and Colonies	5,748	11,003	14,145	110,292	14,347	149,787	155,535
(2.) From India	132	713	376	670	—	1,759	1,891
Total	5,880	11,716	14,521	110,962	14,347	151,546	157,426
IV. Further reinforcements from 1st August, 1900, to 30th April, 1901—							
Regulars—							
From Home and Colonies	1,157	5,427	1,129	12,588	2,686	21,830	22,987
V. Further reinforcements from 1st May, 1901, to 31st December, 1901—							
Regulars—							
(1.) From Home and Colonies	1,244	3,871	1,115	14,286	2,230	21,502	22,746
(2.) From India	108	1,206	—	2,540	3	3,749	3,857
Total	1,352	5,077	1,115	16,826	2,233	25,251	26,603
VI. Further reinforcements from 1st January, 1902, to 31st May, 1902—							
Regulars—							
(1.) From Home and Colonies	777	2,047	1,294	13,502	2,640	19,483	20,260
(2.) From India	69	—	—	6,496	13	6,509	6,578
Total	846	2,047	1,294	19,998	2,653	25,992	26,838
GRAND TOTAL	10,092	26,958	20,490	175,849	22,957	246,248	256,340

(Source) *British Parliamentary Papers*, 1904, Vol. 40, Cd. 1789, p. 44.



[Geographical Map concerned with Native Indian Troops]